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The dominant Sunnī Muslim theology of salvation is based on the principle of retribution. 
Believers in one God will be rewarded with everlasting Paradise while unbelievers will suffer 
eternally in Hell-Fire for their failure to believe. Believers may first have to endure time in 
the Fire to expiate their sins before entering Paradise, but no such hope may be entertained 
for unbelievers. Many Sunnīs support the eternal damnation of unbelievers with Qurʾānic 
verses such as ‘Truly God has cursed the unbelievers and prepared for them a flaming fire, 
abiding therein forever’ (Q. 33:64-5), but further support for this doctrine has also been found 
in an appeal to consensus (ijmāʿ) as in the words of medieval theologian al-Ījī (d. 1355), ‘The 
Muslims have reached a consensus that the unbelievers will abide in the Fire forever; their 
chastisement will not be cut off’ (1997: 3:397). In the traditional Sunnī doctrine of consensus, 
what Muslims have come to agree upon is binding and no longer subject to debate. 
 However, not everyone has always agreed. The doctrine of eternal damnation of 
unbelievers in the Fire received one of its most forceful critiques in the theology of 
fourteenth-century Damascene theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and his foremost disciple 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350). Ibn Taymiyya was a prolific and insightful thinker who 
has inspired a wide range of reform-minded Muslims in the modern period, and he is most 
famous as a key source of authority for Islamic militants such as Osama Bin Laden (d. 2011). 
Ibn Taymiyya’s student Ibn al-Qayyim was equally prolific, and his books are popular in 
Salafī circles throughout the world today. These two figures are not usually known for their 
moderation or their tolerance. So, it often comes as a surprise that they set fourth arguments 
on both Qurʿānic and theological grounds that chastisement of unbelievers in Hell-Fire would 
come to an end, arguments that, as we will see later on, continue to attract some Muslim 
scholars today. 
 What follows is the story of how Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya bypass 
the alleged consensus on eternal damnation of unbelievers in the Fire in order to give 
precedence to a reformist and therapeutic rationale for chastisement leading to universal 
salvation, and then how the Damascene jurist Taqi al-Din al-Subkī (d. 1355), by all 
appearances, forced Ibn al-Qayyim to back down on his views with a refutation of Ibn 
Taymiyya. This account draws together into a single narrative findings published earlier in 
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two studies on Ibn  Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s texts and argumentation 
(Hoover 2009; Hoover 2013; see also Khalil 2012: 80-102). 
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s case for universal salvation 
Ibn Taymiyya’s case for universal salvation was known to several medieval writers, 
but modern scholars were unable to locate it in his own writings until his treatise on the topic 
was published in Saudi Arabia in 1995. The treatise is called Al-Radd ʿalā man qāla bi-fanāʾ 
al-janna wa al-nār (The Response to Whoever Says that the Garden and the Fire Will Pass 
Away) or Fanāʾ al-nār (The Passing Away of the Fire) for short. Fanāʾ al-nār is the very last 
work that Ibn Taymiyya wrote before his death in 1328, which explains why no reflection on 
the subject has been found elsewhere in his corpus. His disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya had 
asked him earlier about the duration of chastisement for unbelievers, but Ibn Taymiyya could 
only reply that it was a great question. He apparently did not know what to think. A while 
later, Ibn al-Qayyim presented Ibn Taymiyya a saying attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad’s 
Companion ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb that he had found in a ninth-century Qurʾān commentary. 
The statement from ‘Umar reads: ‘Even if the People of the Fire stayed in the Fire like the 
amount of sand of ʿĀlij, they would have, despite that, a day in which they would come out’. 
The amount of sand of ʿĀlij, a sandy expanse on the way to Mecca, was presumably very 
great, and the duration of punishment for people in the Fire will be similarly very long. 
Nonetheless, ʿUmar’s saying indicates that there will come a time when everyone in the Fire 
will leave it. This affirmation of universal salvation contradicted the mainstream Sunnī view 
of the Ibn Taymiyya’s day, and it bothered Ibn al-Qayyim enough to ask his teacher what it 
meant (Hoover 2009: 182-5). 
The central arguments of Ibn Taymiyya’s response in Fanāʾ al-nār are worth 
reviewing in some detail. A key section of the treatise presents textual support for the limited 
duration of chastisement in the Fire. Ibn Taymiyya begins with ʿUmar’s report just noted, 
‘Even if the People of the Fire stayed in the Fire like the amount of sand of ʿĀlij, they would 
have, despite that, a day in which they would come out’. According to Ibn Taymiyya, this 
report interprets the quranic witness that those in Hell will be ‘staying in it for long stretches 
of time (lābithīna fīhā aḥqāban)’ (Q. 78:23). ʿUmar’s report clarifies that the ‘long stretches 
of time’ in this verse do come to an end. Medieval Sunnī theologians like Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī (d. 1209) interpreted this verse to apply only to believing sinners in order to reconcile it 
to mainstream Sunnī doctrine: monotheistic sinners will be the ones suffering in the Fire for 
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‘long stretches of time’ before entering Paradise. However, Ibn Taymiyya rejects this 
interpretation and maintains that the verse applies to unbelievers as well. 
Ibn Taymiyya also supports his case with the Qurʾānic verse claiming that the 
residents of the Fire will be ‘abiding in the Fire, as long as the Heavens and the Earth endure, 
except as your Lord wills’ (Q. 11:107). To interpret this, Ibn Taymiyya turns to a report from 
the Prophet’s Companion Ibn ʿAbbās, which reads, ‘It is not necessary for anyone to judge 
God with respect to His creatures or to assign them to a garden or a fire’. In Ibn Taymiyya’s 
view, this report means that the time spent in the Fire need not last forever in an absolute 
sense. Instead, it is contingent upon God’s will and the continuing existence of this world 
(Ibn Taymiyya 1995: 52-70; Hoover 2009: 186). 
The next section of Ibn Taymiyya’s Fanā’ al-nār refutes arguments for the perpetuity 
of the Fire, and two of these are pivotal. According to the first argument, the Qur’ān 
demonstrates the Fire’s perpetuity with verses such as Q. 33:64-5 quoted above indicating 
that unbelievers will abide in the Fire forever. Despite such verses, Ibn Taymiyya counters 
that the Qurʾān does not say that the Fire will never pass away. Rather, those in Hell-Fire will 
‘abide therein forever’ only for the duration of the chastisement. The terms ‘abide’ and 
‘forever’ need not mean that chastisement will continue without end. 
The second argument is that the Muslim community has come to consensus on 
perpetual chastisement of unbelievers in the Fire and that there was no disagreement over this 
matter among the Salaf, that is, the first two or three generations of Muslims following the 
Prophet Muḥammad. Ibn Taymiyya denies that the Salaf have come to consensus on the 
everlasting chastisement of unbelievers in the Fire. He asserts instead that none of the 
Prophet’s Companions ever said that the Fire would last forever in an absolute sense. 
Moreover, the Successors, the generation following the Companions, had divergent opinions 
on the matter. For Ibn Taymiyya a consensus of the Salaf is the only authoritative kind of 
consensus, and such a consensus does not exist on this question. He rejects the dominant 
Sunnī understanding of his day that the Muslim community may come to a binding consensus 
after the era of the Salaf. Such a consensus, Ibn Taymiyya believes, would simply be too 
difficult to verify given the size and spread of the community, and it would be susceptible to 
correction should a stronger proof emerge. This Salafī approach to religious authority is the 
fundamental difference dividing Ibn Taymiyya from traditionalist Sunnism (Ibn Taymiyya 
1995: 71-9; Hoover 2009: 186-7; al-Matroudi 2006: 57-9, 186-7). 
In Fanāʾ al-nār Ibn Taymiyya also provides theological arguments based on God’s 
attributes, beginning from God’s mercy. God’s mercy (raḥma) and God’s forgiveness 
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necessarily entail that the blessing of Paradise last forever without end. However, none of 
God’s names or attributes necessarily entails the perpetuity of chastisement. Moreover, God’s 
mercy is overwhelming and all-encompassing in accord with the Qurʾān—‘[God] has written 
mercy for Himself” (Q. 6:12)—and with hadith reports from the Prophet: ‘My mercy 
precedes my anger’, and, ‘My mercy overcomes my anger’. In view of God’s overpowering 
mercy, Ibn Taymiyya reasons, there can be no everlasting chastisement. In a further 
argument, Ibn Taymiyya appeals to God’s attribute of wisdom, God’s wise purpose (ḥikma), 
in everything that God creates. Given that God’s wise purpose in chastisement is cleansing 
and purifying souls from sin, there could be no imaginable wise purpose in God creating 
everlasting chastisement (Ibn Taymiyya 1995: 80-83; Hoover 2009: 188-9). 
Not only does Ibn Taymiyya’s Salafī approach to consensus and religious authority 
clash with Sunnī traditionalism, but his optimistic appeal to God’s wise purposes in all that 
God creates conflicts with the dominant Ashʿarī theological view that God’s acts without 
purpose or reason. For strict Ashʿarīs, there is no explanation for what God does apart from 
God’s sheer will. Ibn Taymiyya spends considerable energy refuting this Ashʿarī voluntarism 
in other works, and he affirms that God creates all things for wise purposes such that this is 
the best of all possible worlds. God creates even evils for wise purposes that contribute to the 
greater good of educating and purifying human beings and spurring them on to worship God 
alone. The rebellion of Pharaoh and his destruction teach all later generations a lesson 
concerning what to avoid. Illness and falling into sin foster humility, and suffering expiates 
sins. Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of the Sunnī traditionalist notion of consensus and reports like 
those noted above from ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās open the door to rethinking the mainstream 
doctrine of eternal chastisement. Then it was probably Ibn Taymiyya theology of God’s wise 
purposes that, above all else, impelled him to argue for limited chastisement. Punishment of 
unbelievers in everlasting Fire does not fit with Ibn Taymiyya’s view of a God who creates 
all human beings for wise purposes and draws them to worship God alone. Ibn Taymiyya 
never states absolutely in Fanāʾ al-nār that salvation will be universal, but that is clearly the 
upshot of his argument (Hoover 2009: 189-190; Hoover 2007). 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s arguments for universal salvation 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Fanāʾ al-nār, written just before his death in 1328, seems not to have 
aroused much interest until his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya copied portions of it into his 
book on eschatology Hādi al-arwāḥ ilā bilād al-afrāḥ (Spurring Souls on to the Realms of 
Joys). To the best of our knowledge, this book dates to 1345, some seventeen years after Ibn 
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Taymiyya’s death. As we will see below, this is also when Ibn al-Qayyim begins having 
difficulties with the Shāfiʿī chief judge in Damascus Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī. In Ḥādī Ibn al-
Qayyim follows the order of presentation in Ibn Taymiyya’s Fanāʾ al-nār closely and 
examines the relevant texts from the Qurʾān and reports from ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās and others 
in support of limited chastisement. He also greatly elaborates the theological arguments for 
limited chastisement in the Fire in a strongly therapeutic direction. God’s wise purpose in the 
Fire is cleansing, not vengeance, therapy, not retribution. Ibn al-Qayyim writes in Ḥādī, 
‘Trial and punishment are the remedies appointed to remove maladies. They are not removed 
by any other means. And the Fire is the Great Remedy’ (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya n.d.: 332; 
trans. Hoover 2009: 189). He explains elsewhere in Ḥādī, ‘The wise purpose [of God]—
Glory be to Him—required that He make a remedy (dawāʾ) appropriate to each malady (dāʾ) 
and that the remedy for the malady be among the most toilsome of remedies. The 
Compassionate Physician cauterizes one who is ill with the Fire, cauterization after 
cauterization, to remove the vile matter besmirching the upright nature’ (Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya n.d.: 326; trans. Hoover 2009: 190). 
Ibn al-Qayyim also appeals to considerations of benefit and God’s attributes. He 
argues that eternal chastisement does not benefit anyone. God is above needing any benefit 
that might be derived from it, and God’s beloved do not gain any blessing from it either. With 
respect to God’s attributes, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s mercy and good pleasure are 
essential attributes that will overcome God’s non-essential attributes of wrath and anger thus 
implying that the Fire will end. Moreover, God’s wise purpose precludes the evil of eternal 
Hell-Fire: ‘It is not in the divine wise purpose that evils remain perpetually without end and 
without interruption forever such that [evils] and goods would be equivalent in this’ (Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya n.d.: 341; trans. Hoover 2009: 190). 
These arguments might lead us to think that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya unequivocally 
affirms limited chastisement in the Fire. At the very end of his discussion, however, he quotes 
the Qurʾān, ‘Surely your Lord does whatever He wills’ (Q. 11:107), and notes that this final 
appeal to God’s will was the view of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. 
It thus appears that Ibn al-Qayyim backs away from his arguments and simply withholds 
judgment on the duration of the Fire. Ibn al-Qayyim makes this agnostic position much 
clearer in his later work Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl (The Healing of the Sick) where he quotes several 
more sayings of the Salaf leaving the duration of the Fire to God’s will beyond that of ʿAlī b. 
Abī Ṭālib (Hoover 2009: 190-193). 
6 
 
 
In Shifāʾ Ibn al-Qayyim expands Ibn Taymiyya’s theodicy of optimism in which God 
creates all things for wise purposes, and he raises and responds to numerous questions about 
evil, one of which is, ‘What pleasure or good ensues from severe chastisement that does not 
break off or abate?’ (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1994a: 540; trans. Hoover 2009: 191). The 
answer in short is none; there is no good reason for everlasting chastisement. Ibn al-Qayyim 
elaborates his arguments for limited duration of chastisement in the Fire much as he does in 
Ḥādī, but he encounters a somewhat more difficult theological dilemma. In Ḥādī Ibn al-
Qayyim argues that God’s attributes of mercy and good pleasure are essential but anger and 
wrath are not, which allows him to say that the chastisement that flows from God’s anger and 
wrath need not be eternal. In Shifāʾ Ibn al-Qayyim locates the source of chastisement instead 
in God’s essential attributes of justice, might and wise purpose. This has the advantage of 
bringing chastisement under the apparently more rational regime of God’s justice and 
wisdom—God’s attribute anger may imply volatility and capriciousness—but it would also 
seem to imply that chastisement must be eternal by virtue of the eternality of these attributes. 
Ibn al-Qayyim denies that this is so. Rather, God’s attributes of justice, might and wise 
purpose indicate when chastisement should end as these attributes come under the rule of 
mercy and forgiveness. Ibn al-Qayyim explains: 
 
If it is said, ‘Chastisement emanates from His might, His wise purpose and His 
justice. These are beautiful names and attributes of perfection. What emanates from 
them is perpetual by virtue of their perpetuity’, it is said, ‘By God, chastisement 
indeed emanates from might, wise purpose and justice. The end [of chastisement], 
when what is intended is obtained, emanates from might, wise purpose and justice. 
Chastisement and its interruption do not fall outside the sphere of His might, His wise 
purpose and His justice. However, when it ends, might is conjoined with mercy, and 
mercy is conjoined with liberality, beneficence, pardon and forgiveness. Might and 
wise purpose do not cease and do not decrease. On the contrary, everything that He 
created, that He creates, that He commanded and that He commands emanates from 
His might and His wise purpose’ (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1994a: 562; trans. Hoover 
2009: 192). 
 
As already noted above, Ibn al-Qayyim ends his discussion of chastisement in Shifāʾ by 
making his agnosticism more explicit than he did in Ḥādī. He also notes that there is no 
textual support for the perpetuity of the Fire. However, he himself is left with textual support 
in the Qurʾān and in traditions such as those of ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās for two different 
positions: the passing away of the Fire and agnosticism as to its duration. In Hādi and Shifā’ 
he takes the safer course of favouring the agnostic texts, but in a third work he gives freer 
rein to the arguments for limited duration of the Fire (Hoover 2009: 192-3). 
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 This third work is Ibn al-Qayyim’s Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursala (The Thunderbolts Sent 
Out), an extensive work of theology written soon after Ḥādī and Shifāʾ. As the second half of 
Al-Sawā’iq al-mursala, in which Ibn al-Qayyim discusses the duration of the Fire, is not 
known to be extant, we must rely on the abridgement Mukhtaṣar al-ṣawāʿiq al-mursala by 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s contemporary Muḥammad b. al-Mawṣili (d. 1372). The abridgement is 
reliable so far as we can tell, and for the sake of simplicity I will speak of Mukhtasar al-
ṣawāʿiq as Ibn al-Qayyim’s work and refer to it henceforth simply as Ṣawāʿiq. 
 As in Ḥādī and Shifāʾ, Ibn al-Qayyim in Ṣawāʿiq undermines the claim of consensus 
for eternal punishment of unbelievers, interprets the relevant texts from the Qurʾān and the 
Salaf, and argues that God’s mercy will overcome all else. He also calls the Fire God’s whip 
‘to lead His servants to His mercy and His Garden’ (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 2004: 664; 
trans. Hoover 2009: 195), and he marshals a new argument against eternal chastisement: 
God’s justice and blessing preclude chastising someone forever for associationism and 
unbelief that is only of limited length in this life. Moreover, Ibn al-Qayyim leaves aside his 
earlier agnosticism on the duration of the Fire and urges his readers to recognize that 
considerations of benefit, the character of God’s names and attributes, the texts of revelation 
and the witness of the Salaf all lead to the conclusion that chastisement must come to an end. 
Agnosticism as to the duration of chastisement is an option only for those who cannot grasp 
all of this. In Ibn al-Qayyim’s own words: 
 
Those who say that the chastisement of unbelievers is a benefit to them and a mercy 
to them circle around this sense and do not penetrate its depth. But what benefit to 
them is there in chastisement that does not end, that is perpetual by virtue of the 
perpetuity of the Lord—Most High is He?! Ponder this point very thoroughly, and 
give it its due reflection. Join that with the senses of His names and His attributes, 
with what His word and the word of His Messenger indicate, and with what the 
Companions and those after them said. Do not rush to speak without knowledge or to 
condemn. If the dawn of what is correct shines on you, [that is good]. If not, then 
ascribe the judgment to what God ascribes it in His statement, ‘Surely your Lord does 
whatever He wills’ (Q. 11:107), and hold firm to the statement of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib—
May God be pleased with him. He mentioned that the People of the Garden enter the 
Garden and the People of the Fire enter the Fire. He described their state. Then he 
said, ‘After that, God does what He wills’ (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 2004: 663; trans. 
Hoover 2009: 196). 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim here overcomes his earlier misgivings about the duration of the Fire. His 
therapeutic rationality completely eclipses the retributive logic of mainstream Sunnī 
eschatology, and this, supported by the relevant textual indicants, leads him on to unreserved 
affirmation of universal salvation. 
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Al-Subkī’s opposition to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 
There is very little for the historian to go on to ascertain how Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s 
arguments for the limited duration of Hell-Fire were received. Ibn al-Qayyim does not tell us 
anything about his audience and their responses, nor do there appear to be reports about this 
controversy in contemporary chronicles. However, we do know that in 1348 the powerful 
Shāfiʿī chief judge in Damascus Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī intervened with a treatise called Al-
Iʿtibār bi-baqāʾ al-janna wa al-nār (The Consideration of the Perdurance of Paradise and the 
Fire) to shut down Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s argumentation for limited duration of the Fire, 
and, as we will see below, it appears to have worked. This intervention was part of a wider 
conflict between al-Subkī on the one hand and Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim on the other. 
Al-Subkī had written against Ibn Taymiyya on divorce and other legal matters while the latter 
was still alive. The first sign of trouble between al-Subkī and Ibn al-Qayyim appeared in 
1341 when al-Subkī tried to prevent the release of Ibn Taymiyya’s books that had been 
locked up in the Citadel of Damascus from the time of his death. Al-Subkī suffered the 
humiliation of having his efforts thwarted, and the books were turned over to Ibn al-Qayyim 
and one of Ibn Taymiyya’s brothers. Then, in 1345, al-Subkī confronted Ibn al-Qayyim over 
legalities concerning the correct conduct of horse races, and Ibn al-Qayyim had to back 
down. Later, in 1348 or 1349 and soon after completing Iʿtibār, al-Subkī wrote a long 
refutation of Ibn al-Qayyim’s anti-Ashʿarī theological poem Al-Kāfiya al-shāfiya (The 
Sufficient Healing [Poem]). Al-Subkī is explicit in stating that one specific follower of Ibn 
Taymiyya—obviously Ibn al-Qayyim—is insidiously spreading Ibn Taymiyya’s beliefs. 
Apparently, Ibn al-Qayyim’s poem and his Taymiyya doctrines had become sufficiently 
popular that al-Subkī saw need to refute them. Finally, in 1349 the two scholars also 
disagreed on divorce law and had to be reconciled in public (Bori and Holtzman 2010: 22-6: 
Hoover 2013: 397-9). 
Al-Subkī’s 1348 Iʿtibār is a direct refutation of Ibn Taymiyya’s Fanāʾ al-nār. Al-
Subkī does not refer to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and he does not quote or discuss any text 
from Ibn al-Qayyim’s books not already found in Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise. Nonetheless, the 
target of al-Subkī’s ire in historical context is clearly Ibn al-Qayyim. By 1348, Ibn al-
Qayyim’s extensive argumentation for limited duration of the Fire in Ḥādī, Shifāʾ and 
probably Ṣawāʿiq had seeped out into the public domain enough to threaten the orthodoxy of 
the day, much as had Ibn al-Qayyim’s anti-Ashʿarī polemic in his Al-Kāfiya al-shāfiya, and it 
called for al-Subkī’s response (Hoover 2009: 200 n 21; Hoover 2013: 399). 
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Al-Subkī’s refutation neither engages Ibn Taymiyya’s reformist rationale based on 
God’s mercy and wise purpose nor elaborates the retributive basis of his own views with any 
sophistication. Rather, he spends much of Iʿtibār quoting Qurʾānic verses traditionally 
understood to support the eternal damnation of unbelievers in the Fire, and he invokes the 
authority of consensus at the very beginning of the treatise: ‘The doctrine of the Muslims is 
that the Garden and the Fire will not pass away. Abū Muḥammad b. Ḥazm has transmitted 
that this is held by consensus and that whoever opposes it is an unbeliever by consensus’ (Al-
Subkī 1987: 32; trans. Hoover 2009: 187). Expressing any doubt about the Fire’s eternity is 
to break with the consensus of the Muslim community and fall into unbelief. 
The full import of al-Subkī’s appeal to consensus becomes clear in his response to Ibn 
Taymiyya’s charge that there was no consensus among the Salaf. According to al-Subkī, 
reports from the Salaf like those invoked by Ibn Taymiyya to support the limited duration of 
the Fire should not be understood literally. They should be subjected to reinterpretation 
(taʾwīl) to correspond with the consensus, and statements of the Salaf that appear to challenge 
a consensus should be interpreted so as ‘to give a favorable opinion of them [that is, the 
Salaf]’ (Al-Subkī 1987: 79, trans. Hoover 2009: 187). Al-Subkī thus asserts the superior 
authority of a later consensus within the Muslim community over the earlier testimony of the 
Salaf. He leaves no room for Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s reformative 
appeal to the Salaf. The consensus on eternal damnation of unbelievers is inviolable (Hoover 
2009: 187-8). 
 
Ibn Qayyim’s affirmation of eternal chastisement for unbelievers 
It appears that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya bowed to al-Subkī’s pressure to stop arguing for the 
limited duration of the Fire just as he yielded to al-Subkī in their conflicts over horse racing 
legalities and divorce procedures. There is no evidence dating Ibn al-Qayyim’s latest lengthy 
deliberation on the duration of Hell-Fire—that found in Ṣawāʿiq—to after al-Subkī’s 1348 
Iʿtibār, and it most likely came before. Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim briefly affirms the 
eternity of Hell-Fire in three books. One of these, Zād al-maʿād (The Provision for the 
Afterlife), is the last work that he wrote before his death in 1350 and thus definitely dates to 
after al-Subkī’s refutation. The other two works, Al-Wābil al-ṣayyib (The Heavy Shower) and 
Ṭarīq al-hijratayn (The Road of the Two Migrations), may also be late, but they cannot be 
dated precisely. 
The discussions in all three of these works draw a contrast between people who are 
fair (ṭayyib) and foul (khabīth) and explain that the fair and the foul are mixed in this world 
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while only Paradise is fitting for the fair and Hell-Fire for the foul in the hereafter. In Al-
Wābil al-ṣayyib Ibn al-Qayyim sets out the traditional Sunnī view that the disobedient in 
whom the foul and the fair are mixed will eventually leave Hell for Paradise, the abode of 
pure fairness. However, the abode of pure foulness will remain forever. In Ṭarīq al-hijratayn 
Ibn al-Qayyim simply affirms that the abode of Paradise and the abode of Hell both serve 
God’s wise purpose and are permanent. This work also includes an extensive review of 
eighteen levels of humans and jinn in Paradise and the Fire in the hereafter. Throughout these 
discussions, the question of an end to the chastisement of foul unbelievers is never 
entertained (Hoover 2013: 392-4). 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s last work Zād al-maʿād is a wide ranging collection of hadith reports 
from the Prophet. The introduction to this multivolume tome explains how following the 
Prophet leads to happiness in this world and in the hereafter, and Ibn al-Qayyim includes 
observations on how God in his power and wise purpose choses some things over others and 
how he creates some creatures to be fair and others foul. This leads him to consider the 
ultimate destiny of the fair and the foul, and he proceeds to exclude the completely foul from 
any possibility of reform: ‘When an associator (mushrik) is foul in constitution and foul in 
essence, the Fire does not cleanse his foulness. On the contrary, if he were to come out of it, 
he would return as foul as he was [before], like a dog when it enters the sea and then comes 
out of it. Therefore, God—Most High is He—forbade the Garden to the associator’ (Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1994b: 1:68; trans. Hoover 2013: 391). 
It has been argued that Ibn al-Qayyim says nothing in this passage that opposes his 
earlier arguments for universal salvation. Ibn al-Qayyim never formally retracted his belief, 
and he is simply exercising prudence here in view of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī’s wrath while in 
fact affirming nothing more than that the purification of associators will take an extremely 
long time (Khalil 2012: 100-1). It is very well possible that Ibn al-Qayyim continued to 
harbour belief in universal salvation in his heart, especially as he does not explicitly renounce 
it. However, the statement from Zād al-maʿād just quoted clearly states that an associator can 
never attain Paradise, and there is no sign in the surrounding discussion of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
earlier therapeutic concern to show that God’s wise purpose in chastisement is cleansing foul 
unbelievers to render them fair. Ibn al-Qayyim’s final testament, at least outwardly, is thus to 
everlasting punishment of the foul in Hell-Fire, and it is apparent that al-Subkī succeeded in 
preventing Ibn al-Qayyim from writing in any way that might betray belief to the contrary 
(Hoover 2013: 391-2, 396-9). 
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Epilogue 
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya present a powerful challenge to the dominant 
Sunnī doctrine that condemns unbelievers to everlasting chastisement in Hell-Fire. Their 
Salafī rejection of traditionalist Sunnī consensus undermines the structure of religious 
authority in which the doctrine of eternal damnation is rooted, and their theological vision of 
God’s mercy and wise purpose using Hell-Fire as a therapeutic instrument leading even 
unbelievers to eventual salvation overwhelms the retributive rationality giving it sense. Al-
Subkī’s rejoinder misses this theological aspect entirely, and he devotes his efforts to 
restoring mainstream Sunnī doctrine primarily through Qur’ānic quotation and appeal to 
consensus. In the end, al-Subkī succeeded in squelching Ibn al-Qayyim’s voice for universal 
salvation in the late 1340s more by virtue of his influence as a leading scholar in the 
dominant Shāfiʿī legal school than by force of argument. 
Many other opponents through the centuries and down to the present have condemned 
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim for denying the eternity of Hell-Fire. The charge has 
obviously stung as some defenders of the two fourteenth-century theologians have tried to 
absolve them of holding such a purported error. In a prime example ʿAlī al-Ḥarbī, a scholar 
working in Saudi Arabia, argued in 1990 that Ibn Taymiyya upheld the Fire’s eternity. 
Despite very modest evidence to the contrary—this was before the publication of Fanāʾ al-
nār in 1995—al-Ḥarbī could not imagine that so great an Islamic reformer as Ibn Taymiyya 
could believe in the limited duration of Hell-Fire. Al-Ḥarbī also side-stepped important clues 
for the dating of Ibn al-Qayyim’s works in order to portray his undeniable arguments for 
universal salvation in Ḥādī, Shifāʾ and Ṣawāʿiq as little more than youthful exuberance before 
he settled down to correct belief in his mature years (Hoover 2013). Despite such valiant 
efforts to advance the orthodoxy of the Fire’s eternity, even for Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-
Qayyim themselves, the Muslim community has not been able to thrwart the allure of a 
therapeutic vision of Hell-Fire, and other scholars have expressed deep admiration for Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s universalist argumentation. The early twentieth-
century reformer in Egypt Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) cited and praised Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
arguments for universal salvation in Ḥādī to challenge exclusivist attitudes and commend 
God’s great mercy. Riḍā’s views provoked considerable opposition, and in response he 
moderated his enthusiasm for universalism by clarifying that both he and Ibn al-Qayyim 
ultimately left the duration of Hell-Fire to God’s will. A generation later, the  rector of al-
Azhar University in Cairo Mahmūd Shaltūt (d. 1963) wrote favourably of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
arguments, and much more recently, in 2002 and 2003, the widely influential Qatarī-based 
12 
 
 
revivalist Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926) affirmed Ibn al-Qayyim’s universalist argumentation 
as well (Khalil 2012: 101-6, 126-32). Given the powerful precedents for both sides of the 
argument, there is little doubt that Muslim deliberation over universal salvation will continue 
well into the future. At stake is whether retribution or therapy is the fundamental purpose of 
God’s chastisement of wayward and unbelieving human beings. Both rationales for 
punishment are deeply embedded in the Islamic religious tradition and in human experience 
more generally. 
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